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bureau powet' relations. A utodification of Hax Weber's classical ideal 
type bureauct'acy is the ::::on.ceptual model to which socioiog~j cal analysis 
is made. An e&rpiri~al examinati.on of the: variance between the con­
ceptual macel a.nd data collected ir the field is analyzed in order 1:,;0 
(.llustrate inter-bureau power 'relations. The. analysis of tht> conceptual 
model is based upon three a::;S!?:r-t:i::ms. 'l'hi?Y <lre: (1) inter-bureau 
pO\o,rer relations are based upon coercion and not cooperation; (2) nortn­
ative standards that are established by t.he administrators of the 
bureauc.rac.y are differe:nt.lally (~n£orced; and O) goals thRt ar(~ er, t2.blisli;::d 
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Participant-observatiou and casual interviewing techniques wer.e 
the methods employed to coll('ct data. pertaining to the nature of inter­
bureau power relations over II nine month period. The research problem 
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subjective and required recol:JinS over a period of time. The data 
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w(lile an ~mploY~1! of. the oun'llucracy studied. Additional information 
was collected and analyzed from documents related to the functioning 
of the bureaucracy_ Permission was sought and received, from the 
bureaucra.cy and related organ tzations studied, to use the data col­
lected. 
This study found that the Weberian styled conceptual model, 
representing the authority hierarchy of the bureaucracy studied, was 
theoretically based upon GOop{:ration, rationality, logic and equf..li­
tartan principles. Maintaining the Weber ian styled authority hier­
archy·had become ideology to the administrators of the bureaucracy. 
The existence and operation oC this particular hierarchy was made a 
matter of publi.c record, thufi satisfying the political aspects of public 
accountability. However, it was found that there were other o~gani­
zational hierarchies that the administr.ators of the bureaucracy utilized 
in performing the operational functions of the bureaucracy. For the 
pt1"rposes of this thesis the "otherH authority hierarchies were known as 
working models. The authority hierarchies of the working models seems 
to be operat:i.onally based upon the concepts of coercion, differential 
enforcement of norllV::t tive s tandl.lrds, and distortion of administrators' 
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goels. A unique cheUlcteristic of tht.: v10rking :nod~ls ",-1<•.8 that they 
were quasi-secret t and virtually no public records were kept of their 
existence of operation. 
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CHAPTER I 

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 

Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine inter-bureau 
power relations of a specific bureaucracy.l (Inter-bureau power rela­
tions mfers to the relationship maintained between bureaus} that form 
a single bureaucracy on the basis of super and subordination). A refine­
ment of Max Weber's classical presentation of the ideE.l type is created 
in order to establish a conceptual frame of reference fo~ this study. 
This fra"lIla of reference is designated the IIWeberian ideal type model" 
(see Faris, 1966:980 011 the use of cOllceptu::!l models in sociological 
analysis). This ~odel provides the conceptual structure for analysis 
of organizational inter-bureau pOYier relations. Initially, four asser­
tions are discussed in a critical analysis of the modified Weberian 
ideal type model (a discussion of this model is contained in Chapter II). 
This discussion is followed by an empirical examination of an actual 
bureau in an attempt to illustrate the variance betwee.n the Weber ian 
model and the empirical example. The findings of this examination are 
presented in a subsequent chapter. 
~{ethodology 
For the purposes of this study the term bureaucracy, or coreplex 
1. Terms are defined below. 
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organizaticn, refers to all administrative structure composed of separate 
agencies or bureaus which are managed by sets of officials on a super 
and subordination basis. Within a bureaucracy the term bureau denotes 
a component agency that has a fixed position on a hierarchical scale 
that is managed by its own set of officials; a subdivision of a bureau­
cracy. 
With the title of "Assistant Director for Citizen Pa.rticipation"l 
for the McCannville Development Commission (MDC)1 , I was afforded a 
"ring side seat" in the observation and participation of the exercise 
of formal and informal power in the citizen participation realm of 
urban renewal. As an employee of the MDC, my duties included the 
receiving and understanding of the formal public goals of the Commission 
and the proposed formal method of achieving goals. I found that while 
formally claiming an organizational structure that I have designa.ted 
the Weber ian ideal type model, tha orga.nizatiori was forced to informally 
modify its formal authority hierarchy to achieve its formal goals 
(Becker, 1970:14). 
I found that the participant--obser:vation and casual interviewing 
techniques have several dr&wbacks. Primarily, data were collected in 
a nonstandardized we.y, thus taaking statist:ica1 type treatment and 
analysis of information very difficult (Doby: 1954). Consequently, I 
had to depend on a more impressionistic interpretation of some of the 
data in order to make generalizations, thus potentially allowing bias 
to change the impression of emerging data (Doby , 1959). In reference 
1. Fictitious n,"lme. 
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to the participant-observation method, Eugene Webb, ~ a1.) (1966:113) 
in his, Unobtrusive Measures, suggested that, It • no matter how well 
integrated an observer becorees we feel he is still an element of 
potential bias. 1I Thus, Webb's position was that an "observer may se1ect~· 
ively expose himself to data, or selectively perceive it • 1\ Asa 
researcher utilizing the p.!:.rticipant-observer techtlique, I felt Webb's 
point was well taken. The greatest area for bias in this study is "ihat 
M. W. Riley (Fari$, 1966:l0Cl) referred to as Htbe limitation to a 
specific role. 1I As the "Assistant Director for Citizen Participationtt 
for the MDC I was confined to a specific role, and it was from that role 
that most of the data for this thesis were collected. In an attempt 
to "counter-act ll bias, informants were used to supply additional inform­
ation and to confirm previously held notions, thereby acting as a check 
on potential distortions (Deans 1954). Informants were used throughout 
this study, via the casual interview technique. Also; documents, 
minutes of meetings, memorandums, letters, etc., were collected 011 the 
basis of their pertinence to the study. Thus, a check system was devel­
oped to curb the effects of bias in interpretation of data. The parti­
cipant-observation portion of this study was conducted over a nine month 
period, February,1970, through September,1970. 
The theo~etical perspectives for the interpretation of thp. dala 
were primurily a result of a libra.ry search. The books and periodicals 
listed in the selected bibliography were chosen because of their seeming 
pertinence to the problem. 
Permission w'as sought and received from the bureaus and organizations 
involved in this study to use data collected from them. 
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'Ebe Problem 
rne administrators of some formal organizations appear to have 
adopted a form of administrative hierarchy that can be conceptualized 
as a modification of Weber's ide.al type bureaucracy. The formal organ­
ization of some of these bureaucracies seem to follow Weber's descrip­
tion of an authority hierarchy, based upon super and subordinate rela­
tionships. I assert that the reality of inter-bureau power relations 
is somewhat different. 
My first assertion :i.s that coercion, not Weber's conce.pt of cooper­
ation. serves to integrate bureaucratic elements that for~ the functional 
processes of a bureaucracy (Etzioni, 1961b). This is demonstrated by 
an authority hierarchy based upon super and subordinate relationships 
of one bureau (in a chain of bureaus or within a bureaucracy) to another. 
Rules, IIfilest!, laws and regulations, etc., are. not established to in­
sure efficiency of goal attainment ~ =, but are est3.blished as rigid 
boundaries and strong coercive measures to prevent the exerclse of power 
and decision making at certain bureaucratic levels. Thus, rules, laws 
and regulations provide a sanctioning base for those individuals not 
performing to predetermined expectations. Further, employee ratings 
and recommendations for promotions are not in reality based upon job 
knowledge or particular skill, but based upon the employee's ability 
and willingness to "play-the-game," and as a method to coerce those not 
overtly "cooperating" to so do, The role of these mechanisms is not 
indicative of v()luntary or cooperative integrati.on of bureaucratic 
elements, but a c1e~onstration of the exp~ctation that employees may not 
cooperatf:. an.d thereby require rigid control. 
My second assertion is that the normative standards established 
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by the aduinistration of a Dureaucrbcy ar~ differentially enforced 
wi thin bureaus of a giYen bureaucracy. By \vay of illustration, the 
administration of bureau D (the lowest level bureau in a four level 
bureaucracy) may be expected to perio'em certai::l. established duties 
regularly by the administration of bureau A (the highest administrative 
bureau in the bureaucracy), while the directors of bureau A might require 
another of its subordinate bureaus to take only cursory notice of the 
same required duties. Thus, the exist~nce of uniform normative standards 
throughout the bureaucracy allows bureau A, via arbitrary use of sanc­
, -­
tioning power, to control its subordinate bureaus. The administrators 
of subordinate bureaus may violate certain standards with the knowledge 
of the director of bureau A, but the leaders of bureau A retain the 
optional ability to apply sanctions to their subordinate bureaus for 
those violations. Thus, the directors of bureau A by arbitrary use of 
authority over their subordinate bureaus greatly disrupt the authority 
hierarchy of A to B to C to D. This practice is continued on the 
bureau level as well by the supervisors of individual bureaus. 
My third assertion is that goals established by the directors 
of bureau A are subject to distortion and manipulation while being 
"passed down" through the various administrations of subordinate 
bureaus, while the communication relating to the achievement of the 
goals tends to support the original goals intent, as the report of 
accomplishment passes back up the chain of bureaus to the directors 
of bureau A. Thus the administrators of bureau A tend to believe that 
much of the origir.a.l goal has been achieved; the "boss gets what he 
wants to hear." 
CHAPTER II 

REVIE(-l OF THE I.ITERATURE 

Weber's Classic Bureaucratic Model 
Weber's theoretical analysis of the ideal type bureaucratic struc­
ture has been critic1Zed by some contempor<"ry sociologists (lJahrendorf, 
1959; Thompson, 1961; Udy, 1959) for only examining its formal char­
acteristics and ignoring the modifications that occur in actual practice. 
My purpose here is not to add still more criticism of the Weberian 
bureaucratic model, but to illustrate Weber's ideal model as it pertains 
to inter-bureaucratic power relations and specifically that part of the 
Weberian model which relates to the authority hierarchy. The relation·' 
ship of 'Heber's ideal structure to actual working models will be d1s­
cussed in the following sections of this paper. 
Victor Thompson (1961:12) suggests that Weber equates the devel­
opment of modern bureaucracy to the evolution of society; that is, 
modern organizations have evolved from earlier ferms by incorporating 
advancing specialization: 
In an earlier period organizations could depend much more on 
the "line of command." The superior could tell others what to 
do because he could master the knowledge and techniques neces­
sary to do so intelligently. As science and technology devel­
oped, the supervisor lost to experts the ability to comnand in 
one field after another, but retained the right as part of the 
role. 
Technology 1 combined 'Ni th the ever increasing complexity of admin­
istration, has greatly modified the supervisor's role. He has maintained 
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his power and authority through his uoffice,1I but has been fcrced to 
rely on specialized staffs or experts for technical knowledge and pco­
blelll solving strategy. (The term "office," in this case, may be defined 
as a designated position within a bureiiu or bureaucracy that is highly 
defined in terms of duties ana responsibilities, and is located on a 
vertical scale of super and subordination.) Defined areas of authority 
are well marked in modern bureaucracies~ dividing the right to make a 
decision from the ability to do so. Thus the authority hierarchy is 
maintain~d ana relationships of super and subordination are perpetuated. 
Crucial to Weber's position is that authority, repre:senting the right 
to issue orders and expect them to be obeyed, is inherent in the office 
(Peabody, 1964). The office, by its strategic plac'ement and desig­
nation within a bureau or bureaucracy, represents power and authority 
that is inherent in the structure of the organization, thus in Weberian 
terms, it is definable as formal, rational and impersonal. 
Peter Blau (1955:226) offers a useful differentiation between 
power and authority: 
The distinctive feature of authority is that normative con­
straints affect conlpliance with directives. The fact that a 
person compels others to do his bidding by employing coercion 
or sanctions or threats is prima facia evidence that he does 
not have authority over thea in respect to the conduct he 
seeks to bring about. 
Individuals occupy the office and consequently wield the power of that 
office. The amount of power and authority then is regulated by the 
position that the office occupies within the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
The officehol.der is appointed by a superior within the organization to 
hold a specific office. This appointment is theoretically based upon 
tenure, ability <lIul lLerit. Thus, qualit:i.es of charisma and leadership 
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tend to playa secol'ldary role in the selection of a new officeholder. 
Weber (1968:956) states that: 
Although managerial fdp-01ogy still strongly contains the char­
ismatic image, bureaucratic organ.izations seek to nvo:l.d dependence 
upon individuals by reducing relevant information to classes, and 
organizational activity to routines which are activated when the 
apprupriate class of information is perceived. 
Consequently, with the advance of specialization a greater stress 
on departmentalization and routinization of work activity has been 
created. The structure of a bureaucracy is manifested as a department­
alization of offices within a hierarchy in which each office has a 
place in a table or organization, a vertical hierarchical position in 
which the office is subordinate to another office(s). This placement 
of individuals within offices of the formally categorized structure 
becomes what \veber (1968) calls "the prillciple of official jurisdict:tonal 
areas," which is generally ordered by rules, laws and administrative 
regulations. The bureau, within a bureaucracy, is highly departmenta1­
ized, with each individual occupying a specific designated position 
within a department or unit. For each position there are official duties 
assigned, designated authority 1ines~ and methodical provision established 
for carrying out rules and regulations (Weber, 1968). The formality of 
this system is manifested by a means of a more or less complicated social 
ritual which by its nature symbolizes and supports the "pecking order" of 
various offices (Etzioni, 1961:47). 
Such formality, which is integrated 't"ith the distribution of 
authority within the system, serves to minimize friction by 
largely restricting (official) contact to modes which are pre­
viously defined by the rules of the organization. 
Thus the Heberian principle of office hierarchy and the channe1­
ization of cOllUUunication ,.;ithi.n it, clearly establishes a syste.m of 
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super and subordination. The methodology of inter-bureau communicatiol.1. 
is a highly controlled and regul~rized phenomenon. With established 
rules, laws and regulations routinizing and categorizing communication 
the hierarchical structure is reinforced, as options and decisions of 
individuals become sanctionable for noncompliance with established 
procedures. This sanctioning process is based in part upon written 
documents (the "files") which are preserved in their original form and 
provide a managerial base. 1:nese documents provide a focal poim; for 
the exercise of authority by supervisors within a bureau. That is, 
"the files" provide regularized guidelines for office procedure, and a 
nonpersonalized base for sanctioning deviancy from the established 
routines. A supervisor has the option of saying, "it's nothing personal, 
but you know the rules." The supervisor is only supporting the estab­
lished system of laws and regulations and is somewhat protected by the 
formal appearance of objectivity in this decision making process, an 
appearance formulated by this IIscreening" fUl1.:tion of bU1'E'aucratic rules 
(Gouldner, 1954:163). 
Weber IS ide.al bureaucracy is elaborated in Figure 1. The solid 
arrows represent lines of authority 011 a supe.rordinate basis--while 
broken arrows represent the channels of conmunication. 
Bureaucracy XY 1.8 represented. by four aeparate bureaus in a 
relationship of super and subordination. Truit is, bureau A is super­
ordinate to bureaus B, C, and D; while B is subordinate to A, it is 
superordinate to C and D, and so on, leaving bureau D subordinate to 
a.ll and superordinate to none. Formal comLlunication between the bureaus 
follotis the authority hierarchy, thus pe.rformin.g both hierarchy reinfol"dng 
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FIGURK I 

WEBER'S IDEAL TYPE BURE}.UCRACY 

Bureaucracy XY 
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and boundary maint.ananc(;;: functions. 
Maintenance of the hierarchy is accomplished through the estab­
lishruent of la\"s, "(ules and r-egulations. Bureau A, the head agency, 
maintains the superior position in the realm of inter-bureaucratic 
power relations in which it has overriding authority over subordinate 
bureaus. However, bureau B, while subordinate to A's dictums, also 
may require bures.us C and D to comply with its standards and "(ules, 
and C likewise in relation to D. D remains subordinate to bureaus A, 
Band C and consequently is obliged to comply with their requirements. 
Thus, while subordinate bureaus may not disregard or veto regulations 
established by superordinate bureaus, they may add additional require­
ments or regulations for subordinate bureaus and expect compliance. 
Once it is fully established, a bureaucracy is among the social 
institutions which are the hardest to change. Bureaucracy has developed 
as an effective instrument for institutionalizing power relationships. 
Consequently, a system of rationally organized reasons stands behind 
every act of a bureaucratic administration. The more the bureaucracy 
is "dehumanized" (or the more Ifrational"), the more it succeeds in 
eliminating from official business, love, hatred, and all purely person­
aI, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. In 
Weberian terms, this is the specific nature of bureaucracy, and its 
A Critical Analvsis, 
The Role of COf.,rcinn in Inter-Bureau Power Relations. Crucial to 
the description of r.ha Weber ian authoritarian hierarchy i~ the assumption 
that compliaace is based upon cultul.'al 'Iahles, societal norms, ~·md associ­
stional roles (•..J.ish~~. 1970). mh f th f d 
... ,,- .. , - J. ere. ore: .e system 0 super an 
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subordination is viewed as legitimate in the minds of the organization's 
actors in light of the societal socialization process. Consequently, 
in theory, the actors wi thin a bureaucracy spontaneously and will:i.ngly 
"obey those authorities :tn which they can sense, h~wever dimly, even 
subconsciously, their legitimacy!! (Nisbi't, 1970:140). Here the argu­
ment becomes somewhat circular in that authority is made legitimate 
"by the mores, by all the customs aud folkways with which authority is 
conunonly surrounded" (N isbit, 1970: 140) • In short, Weber posits that 
bureaucratic systems are systems that assume cooperation and integration 
of their composite elements, rather than the c,oercion of them. 
Upon examination of inter-bureau power relations, both theoretically 
and analytically, I found that the formal or public presentation of a 
bureaucracy generally followed the Weberian model. Organizational and 
manpower charts nominally supported the Weber ian theory to near per­
fection, while designs of communication systems formally support and 
illustrate the super and subordinate channels of authority_ Laws, 
rules, regulation and the IIfi1es ll are additional .....Titten e~li,dence of 
the applicability of the Weberian model. 
My revie,,, of the mechanisms through which bureaucratic authority 
is exercised however; demonstrates an informal system of coercion and 
blatant authoritarianism that is far more influential in inter-bureau­
cratic power relationships than in \\feber' s formal model. 
The nature of bureaucracy itself is based upon the concept not 
of cooperation, but of coercion, in that a hierarchy of authority is 
established in order to 'have maximum control ove.r subordinates. Con­
sequently, "bureaucratic authority is based not on devotion to the 
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SlJpervj.Bor or respect for him as a person, but on an adaptation neces­
sitated by his power (Blau, 1955:226)." 
Wi-th these concepts in mind, one becomes aware of the conservative 
nature of bureaucracies. The authod.ty hierarchy is not necessarily 
designed to achieve ecals~ '!:Il.lt instead serves the function of pun­
ishing Lhose iadividuals failing to ".omply with established procedures. 
Tnus, it would seem that bureaucracy is not generally designed for 
achievement or goal attainment, out for (he prevention of failure of 
the bureaucratic system. 
The advancement chance of officials and even their chances 
to keep their civil service jobs depend on the rating they 
periodically receive from their supervisor. Such an imper­
sonal dependency creates anxieties and frustrations for most 
adults, and thus the need for adaptation (Blau,,1955:2l9). 
Thus, what would overtly appear to be voluntary obedience to the 
supervisor, is in reality instigated through coercion (job security). 
The subord inates' conCertL with his supervisor's opinion provides the 
supervisor with informal sanctions, since supervisory praise or blame 
becomes significant for every member of the group. Additionally, the 
supervisory practice of rewards and punishments for subordinates demon­
strates that the supervisor does not expect unconditional obedience of 
his directives. A system of reyTards and punishments within such a 
highly organized institution is clearly an example of the coercive 
nature of the supervisory aspect of bureaucracy, because one generally 
can only be "rewarded" for compliance with organizational directives 
established by the bureaucratic officials. Reward is achieved through 
maximum compliance--while punishment tends to be i.ll\lstrative of failure 
to comply witt organizational directives. 
A further illustration of the negativ~ and coercive nature of 
bure.aucracy wa.s reported by ThotlJ~son (1961:15): 
Hierarchical relations overempha.size the veto and under­
emphasize approval of innovation. Since there is no appeal 
from the supervisor's decision, a veto usually ends the matter. 
However, an approval will often go to the next higher level 
where it is again subject to veto. 
The consequence cf this particular authoritarian mentality is 
the 	suppression of innovation and de...·iancy and the promotion of "statuti 
quoism. H 
The following Ibt of tactics available to supervisors as control 
devices is adapted from Downs (1966:l44)~ 
1. 	 The creation, development and implementation of rules and 
regulation. This has the ffect of reducing discretionary 
decision making by subordinates. 
2. 	 "Development of distortion proof message coc.ies for instruc­
tion." This reduces the subordinate option of saying, "I 
didn't understand what I was supposed. to do." 
3. "Development of objective measures of performance." 
·4. "Checking out proposed dil'ectives in adva.nce with subordin­
ates to insure that no extraordinary resistance will occur." 
The first three of these measures are designed to reduce subordin~ 
ates discretionary powers, hence instilling rigidity into the organi­
zation. 
A further method of control is tte requirem,~nt of keeping written 
reports of tra~sactions and performances, which provide sup~rvisors with 
a means of exerting control over their subordinates. 'These re~orts have 
three major purposes: 
1. 	 They infol:ID high-level officials about what is happening 

in the lewer J.evels of the bure%lucracy. 

2. 	 The necessity of preparing periodic reports serves to re­
mind each subordinate that he must meet certain standards 
of performance. 
3. 	 The fear. of punishment for failure to meet those standards 
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encourages him to carry ou.t desired performances or at 
least report having done so (Downs, 1966:144). 
The third point is perhaps the most crit:f.ca1 one for the pur­
poses of this paper--lIthe fear. of punishment for failure to meet t~ose 
standardsn is clearly indicative of the coercive nature of the bureau­
cratic hierarchy. The subordinate is not willingly complying to a 
supervisor's directive; he may be coerced into doing so by the threat of 
sanctions. As B1au (1955) suggestR, the ultimate source of burcau­
cratic authority is the official power of sanction, externally bestowed. 
One of the most widespread and complex devices employed by a 
bureaucracy to control subordinate agencies is separate monitoring 
organizations. 
The purpose of the external monitoring service is to determine the 
extent to which compliance to established procedures is being maintained. 
Thus, the monitoring service is another mechanism for the maintenance 
of the status quo nature of the bureaucracy by the discovering and 
reporting areas of noncompliance, thereby providing still another 
basl.s for issuing sanctions. 
Bureaucratic rules are particularly illustrative of the coercive 
nature of bureaucratic hierarchies. Rules comprise a functional equi­
valent for direct, personally given orders. Like direct orders, rules 
specify the obligation of the ,..orker; hence, rules serve to narrow the 
subordinates area of discretion. Subordinate's. have fewer options con­
cerning what they mayor may not do, and the area of "privilegen is 
crowded out by the growing area of lIob1igation't (Gou1dner, 1954:163). 
The public nature of rules enables deviancy to be detected by any super­
visor, thus enlarging the informatior.al channels open to the heads of 
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bureaus and in turn enabling them to keep thei.:r. own subordinates in 
line (Gouldner, 1954:163). Official sanctions normally occur w:i.thin 
the frame~ork of these pre-e~istin8 rules vf the organization. Rules, 
ther.. form both a potential sanctioning base for ~upervisors and also 
represent boundaries of obligatory behavior. 
What has been discussed to this point is the reality of bureau­
cratic power relations. Of some sociological significance is the degree 
of divergence between the formal public presentation of the bureau­
cratic power structure compared to the informal or real nature of the 
organization. In the public presentation of its organizational struc­
ture, the bureaucracy appears to be rational, equalitarian, and just, 
with its authority hierarchy established as being both legitimate and 
humane. Efforts are instigated by "top-level" management to promote 
this image both internally and externally. Continual propagandize­
ment of the ideal model to the actors within the bureaucracy and to the 
society at large performs the function of making any deviancy from the 
ideal model seem to be only a local or isolated problem, and therefore, 
not ubiquitous to the system itself. However, an examination of the 
mechanisms by which a bureaucracy operates has revealed a rigidly 
authoritarian and coercive structure. Its nature relies on power 
relations rather than cooperation for its functioning; consequently a 
bureaucracy is oriented towards "status quo.:i.sm" rather than achievement 
and innovation. 
Differential Enforcement of ~ules and Regulations. Differential 
enforc~ment of rules and regulations will be discussed on both the inter­
bureaucratic a::,o. bUrf:.3'-lCratic level.:;. 
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l{ormclti"vc standards, al'; manHested through organizational r.ules 
and regulations, may receive differential enforcement between the 
bureaus of a single bureaucracy. That is, action agency D, at the 
bottoT'l of the model (see Figure I, p. 13), might be expected to perform 
certain universally required duties by At the lIhead" bureau, while A 
might require subordinate bureau B only to take cursory notice. The 
existence of normative standards allows A to control, via sanctioning 
power, its subordinate bureaus. Bureaus B, C and D may violate certain 
staudards with the knowledge of A, but A retains the optional ability 
to sanction its subordinate bureaus for those violations (Blau, 1955). 
The result of thls overriding authority is a significant compromise 
of the ideal model. In that A may sanction B, C, or D without using 
designated channels of A to B to C to D, likewise, B may exercise the 
same option in regard to C and D, as illustrated in Figure II. 
Bureau B, represented by the black bar, mayor may not maintain 
the same relationship to bureaus C and D, depending upon the discretion 
of A. 
Bureaus C and D in this model have the same informal and formal 
authority and communication channel because of thelr placement within 
the hierarchy. 
The solid bar and arrows on the left of the figure represent 
the actual or informal authority and communication channels that 
bureau A has the option to exercise in an attempt to assure inter­
bureaucratic compliance with normative standards. This model illustrates 
a violation of its counter-part, the ideal model, in that the powers of 
subordinate bureaus are usurped hy bureau A by by-passing them in an 
attempt to deal direetly with all leveLs of the bureaucracy. 
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FIGURE II 

A WORKING MODEL 

Bureaucracy XY 
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It should be noted that. this is an example of how one working 
model may operate within Bureaucracy XY, and is not meant to be the 
exclusive working model of the bureaucracy. As circumstances and events 
evolve within the bureaucracy, the working model also tends to adjust 
to the changing situations. 
Differential enforcement of normative standards (rules and regu­
lations) is perhaps mos'i,: obvious within a single bureau because the super­
visor is responsible for all operati::ms ydthin hb department and is 
consequently reliant to some degree on the cooperation of his subordin­
ates.The fact that he may occasionally yield to some of their collect­
ive demands indicates that the group can exert some influence over 
his decisions. These concessions however, tend to furnish him with 
discretionary sanctions and create social obligations wh:l.ch extend his 
power and establish his authority over every individual subordinate. 
As a result, his authority is validated through social interaction 
which enables him to control his subordinates much more effectively 
than they control him (Blau, 1955). 
According to Blau (1955:214),when a new supervisor takes over a 
department there is an initial period of leniency which allows the 
supervisor to: 
1. 	 Use subordinates' first names in order to foster cordial 

relations. 

2. 	 Never issue commands. 
3. 	 Always make polite requests. 
4. 	 Explain reasons for directions. 
5. 	 Show willingness to rescind directives if subordinates 

desire :It. 

6. 	 Demonstrate willingnE:ss to help subordinates "get ahead." 
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7. Permit oubordinat~s to break minor rules. 
The rationale of the above techniques is to create social obIi­
gati.ons of subordinates to toe superV:l.80r. Thus t toleration and 
leniency toward exceptional or even illicit practices 't-lill actually 
enhance the power of a supervisor, i.e. a rule tl~t is regularly broken 
extends the discretionary power of the superviso~, because it furnishes 
him with a base through which he can issue legitimate sanctions when he 
sees fit. 
By voluntarily relinquishing some of his prerogatives, the 
supervisor created social obligations. His requests for co­
operation when he could issue orders, his promises for future 
help, his toleration of prohibited practices and spe:ial favors 
for agents, his references to his identHication with them 
and his conside-cate IDallner--all these serve to oblige.te his 
subordinates to him (Blau, 1955:2J.5). 
Ideally then, the supervisor:; appear to be somewhat altruistic 
in their approaches to management, supportiug their subordinates when­
ever possible, but in reality this support is manifested in the control 
the supervisor gains over his subordinates by creating social and 
personal obligations to himself. 
Inter-Bureaucratic Distortion of Coals. The formal public 
function of all the activities within a bureaucratic hierarchy is the 
achievement of goals. Ideally, the organization is structured for the 
"effective" accomplishment vf the purpose. Simply speaking, bureau A 
is primarily interested in controlling the bureaucracy in order to 
achieve its goals to the greatest possible extent. 
The head of bureau A (theoretically the most powerful individual 
in the bureaucracy) oversees many policies; consequently he must 
formulate each onc in broad general tErms, and does not have time to 
work out the details. The details, then are left to subordinates to 
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be. worked out. Therefore, the orders of top-le\1'el management are 801­
most always general in nature (Downs, 1966). 
Top-level officials cannot review everything done by sub­
ordinates 1n response to thefr orders. It might seem, there­
fore, that they might review the most important responses, or 
those likely to be executed badly. However, if their selection 
for review can be easily fore.:ast, subordinates will have great 
discretion regarding those orders that will not be reviewed. 
This ~ill drastically reduce official control over the organi­
zation (Tullock, 1965:186). 
The meaning of the last passage is significant in that it S'l1g­
gests the need to use coercive methods in order to gain compliance from 
subordinates who would not otherwise comply with the orders given them. 
The Weberian model posits that bureaucratic a.:tivity is both rational 
and predictable because the source of authority is located in the 
office as opposed to being located within the individuals who occupy 
the office (Peabody, 1964). This approach tends to ignore the moti­
vations and attitudes of the humau beings working within the organization. 
Anthony Downs (1966:135) in his work, Inside Bureaucracy, states 
that: 
There are very few orders so pre(!iGe and unequivocal that 
they cannot be distorted by a factor cf 10%; consequently, 
B's orders to his C level subordinates embody only 90% of what 
A originally desired. C level will distort because its goals 
will be dHferent, if only slightly, from A's aud B's. If 
similar distortion occurs by the time A's orders get to D 
level they will contain only 53% of A's original goals. 
Downs terms this process "authority leakage" and suggests that 
it is a common phenomenon when orders are passed down through levels 
of a hierarchy, and that this leakage tends to become cumulative when 
many levels are involved. What, in reality happens, then, is that 
administrators of bureau B believe that a aU.ght distortion of the order 
can help him personally, or he may consciously or subconsciously distort 
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orders so that his bureau T.vill be best benefited. This concept ...·lould 
logically apply to bureaus C and D as well. A bureaucracy must contend 
with not the smooth functioning of the ideal model, but the varying 
personalities, abilities, attitudes, memories, images of goals, etc.! 
of the individuals who occupy offices within the structure. The 
following is an adaptation of a mechanism Downs la.bels the "basic con­
trol cycle. 1I 
1. 	 An official issues a set of orders. 
2.' 	 He allows his subordinates time to put each order into 

effect. 

3. 	 He selects certain orders to evaluate his subordinates 

performances. 

4. 	 He seeks to discover what has actually been done at lower 

levels as a result of the orders. 

5. 	 He compares the effects of his orders with his original 

intentions. 

6. 	 Evaluates results of the order and selects appropriate action. 
7. 	 If he elects to issue further orders as a result of his evalu­
ation, the cycle starts again (Downs, 1966:144). 
If the hierarchy functioned as the public formal model suggested, 
actual control of the activities of the bureaucracy would be in the 
hands of the top-leve.l management. However, those offj.cials :Dust al­
ways delegate some of their power to subordinates; hence the "rub," and 
the need for anti-distortion devices to obtain compliance. Individuals 
within the organizational structure are subject to the attributes and 
failings of humans, and consequently require monitoring, direction, coaching 
and must be 	generally coerced into the proper performance. 
Weber suggests that organizations, as problem solving mechanisms, 
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depend upon factoring of the general goal into subgoals and these. sub-
goals into sub-subgoals and so on, until concr.ete routines are reached 
(Thompson, 1961). These subgoals are allocated to the organizational 
units or departments and become their goals. This pattern is indicative 
of the "order giving" process. That is, in passing orders downward, 
subordinate bureaus must translate commands received into more specific 
and expanded form. As we have previously discussed, this ideal bureau­
cratic function does not take into account the human element and as a 
consequence a system of formal and informal sanctions and rewards has 
been created to account for and motivate the human actors. 
Bureaucracy in Perspective. Bureaucrats, though publicly and 
formally defending and supporting the Weberian model, have had to com­
pensate for that model's inability tc cope with daily operationel func­
tions by creating an informal "working" model. This informal model may 
vary from organization to organization, but one may say, with sorne 
assurance, that it inevitably exists. 
Of considerable importance is the latter model, in that it euforces 
conformity, and threatens innovation at lower levels as deviancy, thereby 
assuring a spirit of benign "status quoism." As Downs (1966:50) posited: 
While the tendency of administration may appear to be benign 
and peaceful, as opposed to turbulence of conflict, it is actually 
violent. It demands compliance; nothing less than compliance 
will do; aud it must obtain compliance;, by persuasion or manage­
ment if possible, by repression if necessary. 
In essence, the nature of the mechanisms of the actual operation of 
a bureaucracy are strongly coercive in demanding compliance to established 
procedures, and in Downs' terms this "imposed order [compliance] is 
vIolent." 
1'his conc::;;pt is further amplified when one considers that the 
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~.dministrc.tion of a. bure~ucracy rej€.cts the concept of conflict a& a 
desirable element of society. The administration wants extremes ad­
justed; it wants differences settled; and primarily, it wants to find 
a set of procedures that it can use exclusively within the organization. 
Whatever or whoever refuses to be adjusted is considered by supervisors 
as a deviant, a departure from the norm,that must be treated and cured. 
Consequently: 
Discipline and control may inhibit initiative and creativ­
ity on the part of subordinates. They may hesitate to assume 
or' go out of their way to avoid responsibility. A worker 
may tell his boss what he thinks his boss wants to hear. 
Despite these potential inhibiting and disruptive consequences, 
authority remains an inevitable aspect of complex organiza­
tions (Peabody, 1964:10). 
In sum, the system that is largely responsible for the adminis­
tration of this country is treating procedure and knowledge as absolute, 
and establishing mechanisms of control and operation to insure accpetance 
by the actors within the orgalllzation. With the advent and rapid adop­
tion of technology and technological change in our society, it would 
seem more appropriate to view knowledge and procedure as relative, as 
opposed to absolute. 
CHAPTER III 

AN EMPIRICAL ~~~LE 

IntroductioI:. 
The intent of Chapter III is to present a description of an event 
in the urban renewal process on che action agency level. The event, 
the selection of a park site, is treated in terms of IIwhat" happened 
in this section; while the analysis of the selection process will bc 
discussed in Chapter IV. Chapter III, then, illustrates an empirical 
example of inter-bureau power relations as they are manifested in the 
urban renewal process on the bureau level. The relationship to tha 
Weber ian model in a technical sense will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapter. 
Park Site Selection: An Empirical Example 
The McCannville Development Commission (~IDC) will be the bureau 
discussed, and the selection of a park site in the Hayes District will 
be the empirical example through which the above concepts will be 
examined. 
The selection of the park site in the Hayes Di.strict vas chosen 
for analysis because: (1) it affords an empirical example of the con­
cepts of citizen participation; (2) it provides a link between inter­
bureau and bureau relations; and (3) it further illustrates the working 
and ideal type bureaucratic models. (The term working model refers to 
an empir.ical administrative structure composed of separate bureaus, or 
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department':! "lithin bureaus, ~hat rr..ay or may not conform to the estab­
lished organizational structure.) 
According to Department of Rousing and Urban Development (HUD) 
regulations, the residents of the Hayes Distric.t would, through their 
community association, assist tIle MOC in the planning, selection and 
execution of a park site in their neighborhood. But the extent of 
citizen involvement in the act~al selection of a park site was the 
endorsement of a Co~uission developed and sponsored plan. This is in 
essence the thrust of this chapter. 
The Neighborhoo~ 
A broad view of the District which is the context for park site 
selection can be briefly sketched as follows" 
During the study, the Hayes District was primarily a residential 
community covering about 360 acres in the city's Northeastern section. 
Of the 1,500 homes in the District, 95% were single family houses. 
Although no detailed survey had been made as to the physical conditions 
of the houses in the District, a "conservative" estimate would have 
been about 30% in substandard conditions ~ half of whlch could be ccd1ed 
dilapidated. 
Tbere were about 35 businesses in the District, whose clientele 
were primari1ydra~~ from outside the district. The few businesses that 
serve mostly the Hayes District were, to a large extent, in substandard 
buildings with no off-street parking. 
Community facilities serving the District were: one public 
elementary school, three churches and an old fire house converted into 
a youth centc:r. Thera were no parks in the District itself. 
There are approxima.tely 12 1/2 miIes of streets in the District; 
about 1/2 were either unpaved or in substandard condition with only 
a narrow paved strip down the middle of the right-of-way. 
Of the residents, approximately 35% were black, 55% were 65 years 
1 
or older, and 75% made $5,000 a year or less. 
In relation to the whole Northeastern section of the city the 
Hayes District represen&s a fair approximation of the average neighbor­
hood, it is not the most blighted area, nor ie: it the nlost prosperous. 
When compared to overall McCannville residential standards, it was 
easily a substandard neighborhood. 
Background of the Park Sit.e 
The initial idea of a park for the Hayes District 't.'ss c.evelolJed 
by the McCannville City Planning commissicn,2 the city agen~y respon­
sible for long range comprehensive d.ty planning. The }IDC "ras adv ised 
of this plan, and agreed to incorporate the proposed park site in its 
3
application to HUD for Nf~ighborhocd Del1elopment fundn.· \ofue'll the program 
was approved by HUD, and the funds allocated, the Commission was committed 
to developing a park in the Hayes District. As far as the par.k was 
concerned~ the Commission's goel became the coordination of the Hayes 
District Community Association (HDGA) with the various city agencles 
1. Taken from a document about the "Hayes District tl written by the 
author while an employee of the Commission. 
2. Commission docu~ent concerning citizen participation in the 
"Hayes Dist.rict," September 11, 1970, p. 4. 
3. The Neighborhcod Development Program is a federally funded 
urban renewal progra.m to \Olhich the Commission applied and received funds 
fer the administration oi. 
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for the approval and eXecution of the park site porticn of the Neigh­
borhood Development Program (NDP) plan. The citizeu participation 
staff of the MDC received the assignment of gaining citizen approval 
for the Commission's planned park. Since the park was included in the 
first year's program, mID required that it be 80% completed by the end 
of the "action" year. (The action year was from July 1, 1970 to June 
30, 1971 .• ) Thus, early resident approval of the park site was imper­
ative. 
Park Site Selection 
The MDC set the HDCA approval date for the psrk site as the 
15th of April, 1970. In February, the director of citizen participation 
for the MDC informally brought the park site topic to the attention of 
the chairman of the HDCA. After several informal discussions, the 
chairman agreed to support a Commission planned park for the neighbor­
hood. With the support of the chairman, the director of citizen parti­
cipation next secured the support of the ~xecutive board of the HDCA. 
This was accomplished over a period of approximately two weeks. 
The first official public mentfon ofa park for the Hayes District 
was in a general membership meeting, Get:eral membership meetings of 
the HDCA were open to all residents of the District. The meeting of 
the HDCA was held on March 10, 1970. The director of citizen parti­
cipation for the Commission "requested that the executive board meet 
with the Park Bureau and other appropriate agencies in order to determine 
the location of the park." (HDCA Gen~ral Membership Meeting, March 10, 
1970) • 
There was no action tak",n on this request at this meeting; hoW'e'Ter, 
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t-he supposition that there would be a park in the Dj.stl'ict had been 
introduced, made formal record of, and received no opposition. On the 
24th of March, the executive board of the RDCA had a regular meeting. 
At this session, the director of citizen participation "asked" that a 
special subcommittee of the HDCA be formed to "consider the location of 
a park site and work with the Park Bureau, City Planning Commission, 
HDC and other appropriate agencies ill developing the park." (BOCA 
Executive Board 1Unutes, March 24, 1970). A subcommittee was fCirmad 
called the Physical Planning COllWl:Lttec, made up of executive board 
members of the HDCA. 
It is important to note that: a. tentative park site locatfon had 
been developed by the City Planning Commission in conjunction with the 
MOC and other lIappropriate a.gencies," prior to any actual resident 
involvement in the actual plenning. 
1At this meeting, a Mr. Thomas was elected by the executive 
board to be the HDCA's planning consultant. Mr. Thomas was a resident 
of the District and had been an active member of the HDCA since its 
inception. Mr. Thomas was also a registered architect. (Several days 
after his election to his new post, ~~. Thomas was placed on the MOC 
payroll as the planning consultant to the Hayes District.) When asked 
by the chairman of the BOCA to act as the consultant to the Physical 
Planning Committee, he accepted. 
On March 31, the Physical Planning Committee held its first 
meeting. Attending this meeting were the seven executive board members 
1. Fictitious name. 
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appoi~l1ted to the committe€' and nine MOe members. After an election of 
officers for the committee, Mr. Thomas incroduced the proposed park 
site. The nine MOG staff were there to primarily answer questiolls 
about the park site design and location. There was no opposition to the 
proposed plan, Mr. Thomas "reported that with this map (;nap refers to a 
map of the Hayes District) and the bu.dget information, he ......ould be 
able to work out 3 recommendation to the committee as to the park for 
the next meetlng. 1l (HDCA Physical Planning Committee, March 31, 1970) • 
.On April 6, the Physical Planning Committee approved the park 
site. This meeting was attended by five committee members and eight 
MOC staff, including the executive director of the Commission. The vote 
to accept the pIau was unanimous. 
Only one plan was presented t.o the committee, and only their approv­
al of it was sought. There was virtually no.::.i.then input in tht;: 
design of the plan, nor was it sought, or asked for by the Commission. 
April 14 was the date set for the general membership me~ting of 
the HDCA in which formal, public accpetance of the park site was to 
be attained. Since the chairman, the ex~cutive board and the Physical 
Planning Cornroittee of the Association were already committed to supporting 
the plan, the Commission \Jas relatively confident of its approval 
by the general membership. 
Mr. Thomas introdu.ced the proposed p'3.rk site to over 100 res:!.dents 
attending the meeting (8 record attendance for an lIDCA meeting), by 
stati·ng that the bOUlldarie!:: of the park had been selected by the members 
of the Physical Planning Committee (Physical Planning Committee, March 
31, 1970) of the HDCA. After his presentation of the site to the resi.dents, 
the MOC staff attending che meeting were available to answer residents' 
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questions. 
The unexpected happene.dj small groups of the residents begao to 
strongly oppose the plan. It had become obvious to them that they were 
not being asked to participate in planning or decision making, but to 
approve an already existing plan. The issue became either accepting the 
plan, or not having a park in the neighborhood. This put tr.emendous 
pressure on the chairman and the executive board, not to mention the 
HDC staff present. The leadcr:}hip of EDt;A and th'3 technical nexpertise" 
of the staff had been seriously challenged. The struggle between the 
residents and the leadership of the HDC~ and the MOe staff continued 
for well over an hour. A staff member (an engineer) suggested that an 
alternative plan be drawn up and presented at another meeting, thereby 
offering the residents a choice. As this became a motion and was being 
voted on, the chairman of the Physical Planning Committee moved that the 
plan presented be tentatively approved. (This motion was made at the 
personal and private request of the director of citizen participation 
for the MOC.) Both motions were passed by majority vote of the member­
ship. The next meeting of the HDCA genera!. mem:'ership was set for 
April 20. 
During the six days that ensued between the first and second 
meetings, the original plan was designated by the Commission as Plan A, 
(Figure III), while the alternate plan 1;-1aS to be kno'WIl. as Plan B, 
(Figure IV). PlanE ";&.5 of rather intereDting design in that it was 
cut in half by one of the neighborhood's largest arterial thoroughfares, 
wbich meant; (1) that the park would be a potential trap for children 
playing on the fringes of the park near the road; or (2) that the road 
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itself 'Would be. closed, thereby ci.ivcrt:.ing the thru traffic. into the 
resident:i.al sr.reets around the park. The Ccmmi::;sion decid.ed it would 
be best to close the street. 
Prior to the April 20 meeting of the HDCA, the citizen partici­
pation staff was able to reaffirm thp. sllpport of the c.hairm.an, the 
executive board, and the Physical Planning Committee. 
At the April 20 general membership meeting, y~. TIlomas presented 
both Plan A and Plan B to the residents. But now the issue had become 
whether to choose Plan A or Plan B, and not whether or not to have a 
park in the District. The residents, with very little staff assistance, 
decided that Plan A was superior to Plan B, and passed it by a majority 
vote. 
In sum, the MDC was able, through the use of what I have identified 
as a working model, to achieve its goal, the selection and approval of 
a park site by the residents of the Hayes District, thus satisfying 
the ~equirement for citizen participation in the planning and develop­
ment of community projects. In attaining resident approval for the park, 
the Commission used both implicit and explicit coercion; it largely 
distorted the goal of citizen participation as outlined by HUD, and it 
differentially enforced not only HUD regulations but its own regulations 
as well. An ~nformal working model of citizen participation was devel­
oped in order to facilitate greater passa~e of the park site by the 
residents. The director of citizen participation, with the aid of an 
assistant, the autho~, successfully and informally contacted and 
received the support of the chairman of ehe HDCA, the Executive Board, 
and the Physical Planning Committee, prior to any formal meeting of 
the lIDCA or any of its subcomm1.ttees. The informal model continued in 
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operation until final passage of the site by the general membership of 
the lIDCA. Thus, in the selection of a park site in the Hayes District, 
both real and ideal models of citizen participation were illustLated 
as well as the concepts of coercion, distortion of goals and the differ­
ential ~nforcement of rules and regulations. 
CRAPTER IV 

FINDINGS: IDEAL AND WORKING MODELS 

A WOt'king Model: Ail Urban Renev,al Agency 
In the selection of a working model to illustrate the theoretical 
concepts of this paper, an urban rer.ew&l bureaucracy was ch.Jsell. T!le 
reasons for this choice were; (1) the nature of a federal non-profit 
organization seemed amenable to this kind of study; (2) the public 
"accountability" (public accountability is that aspect of control, 
both overt and covert, that a society maintains over institutions 
accountable to it to furnish explanations for its activities) of a 
federal bureaucracy; and (3) the autho~f~ nine month participaut­
observation experience ·lI1ithin an agency of the bureaucracy. 
With these points in mind, lv-e will initially examine the action 
agency itself, before presenting an overview of the whole bureaucratic 
system. I have chosen to call this action agency the McCannville 
Development Commission (MDC), as opposed to using its real name, for 
my purposes here are academic. That is, the primary interest of this 
study is the examination of some of the operational functions of a 
complex organization, and is not intended to be material for an expose. 
Likewise, the city that supports the Commission will be known as 
McCannville. This city is located on the West coast and has a population 
of a half million, of which 50,000 are minority group members (non­
whitp.s, primarily blacks). 
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The McCannvi1le Development CO'CllUissioll is responsible fer all urban 
renewal activities in the city; however, due largely to the availability 
of federal funds for urban renewal in black districts, many of the Com­
mission efforts are focused in the black inhabited Northeastern section 
of the city, (a topic to be dealt ~vith in subsequent pages). The Com­
mission was established by McCan~ville voters through a city charte~ 
amendment in 1958, and charged with the following: 
• the Department of D",ve1opmE:i.i.t and Cbric Prc::lctic::. I!: 
is responsible for HcCannvi11e's urban renewal programs and 
assists in the promotion of commercial and industrial develop­
ment. One of the Commission~smajor objectives has been to blend 
citizen participation ~\7ith the roles of local, state and federal 
agencies in the planning and development of its projects. 
(Taken from the actual Urban Renewal Commission's definition 
of its role in the cOlT.'.munity, published in mimeograph form.) 
Simply then, the MOe is responsible to the City Council of McCann­
ville for the city's urban renet.1al, with a pledged emphasis on citizens' 
participation. To carry out this goal, the Commission was organized 
with a single chairman at its head, four commissione.rs and an executive 
director with a staff of approximately sixty to administer its various 
programs. The formal organization and power structure are illustrated 
in Figure V. It closely follows the Weber ian ideal model, in that it 
is headed by a c:18.irman who wields ult:imate power and authority, support­
ed by four commissioners subordinate to him, but superordinate to the 
administrative staff: an executive director subordinate to the chairman 
and the commissioners, but superordinate to his staff, etc. Lines of 
formal communication generally follow the vertical lines of authority, 
i.e. the submission of monthly activities reports initiated in a field 
office will follow the vertical channels of authority as illustrated in 
Figure V. It is iwpoltant to note that most formal activities (those of 
FIGURE V 

THE IDEAL MODEL 
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of a rOt4tine nature), generally follow the public ideal model. When 
an activi.ty or decisioll does .!!£.t require a policy type decision, the 
public model is followed. The reason for the presentatioll of the Weber­
ian like ideal model, to the public and the staff itself, appears to 
be the legal requirement of public accountability of the Commission. 
The nature of urban rene"al activities in a comnlll:nity and the expen­
diture of federal funds place the Commission under the scrutiny of 
monitori:ng agencies of all kinds, the mQss media, groups gnd clubs 
of every description, as well as private citizens. Therefore, whenever 
possible, the Commission presents itself as the ideal model bureau that 
is run by rational, logical design, with an expert technical staff, 
maximum citizen input, and an equalitarian chain of command. Figure V 
then represents the formal public organization of the Commission's 
hierarchical structure. 
Figure VI illustrates the actual working model when other than 
routine matters are at issue, i.e. policy making, press releases 
(other than routine), hiring and firing of staff, special problems, 
etc. While activities carried out under the formal model are carefully 
documented and tlfiled" as a matter of public record, meetings of the 
working model tend to be informal and unrecorded, thus the working model 
exists in quas~-secret form. This modification of the ideal model is 
necessitated by: (1) a need to by-pass channels when a time element is 
involved; (2) the ineptitude of certain staff members :I.n critical posi­
tions; (3) the generally clumsy nature of the ideal model; and (4) the 
unique positi0n and personal capabilities of the five members of the 
working model to actually run the Comm;,ssion somewhat compete.ntly. 
FIGURE VI 
THE WORKING MODEL 
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The connecting black line represents the actual "working" hierarchy of those who actually make decisions 
within the Commission. 
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The point is that the Co~uission maintains twv hierarchies. The 
first is a formal public pres~ntt,tion of the agency which is similar 
to the I<1eberian model Qf a rational mOll'.)lith, with relationships of 
super and subordination, supported by expert technical staffs. The 
reason for this phenomenPnis largely du~ to the public accountability of 
the Commission and the consequent need to d~monst:rate its !'ati.onc:.l, 
professional, equalitarian nature, hence the adoption of the \veberinn 
mod~l. TIle ~econJ is the wo~king model, made up of those elemeuts with­
in the agency that actually wield decision making power. 
Organizational Structure of the Urban Renewal Bureaucracy 
The organizational structure of the urban renewal bureaucracy is 
in itself relatively simple. It, like the action agency, adheres to 
a Weberian like public model while often working through a modification 
of that model in attaining its goals. The ideal, or public model, may 
be defined as rigid, rational and formal organization with highly defined 
authority and communication channels, with the amount of power regulated 
oy the position of the office within the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. 
Theoretically, each bureau has its defined jurisdictional area arranged 
vertically in a Weberian styled ideal hierarchy. That is, each bureau 
has its areas of responsibility, power, and control in relationship 
to the bureaucracy as a whole. 
The controlling agency of this bureaucracy is the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which "governs" its subordinate 
bureaus through a system of rules, laws and regulations, and the allo­
cation of federal funds. Thus, the administrators of HUD or bureau A, 
maintain their superior position as the head bureau with overriding 
A 
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authority over their subordinate bureaus. Though each of the subor­
di.nate bureaus is obligated to follow HUn's dictums, they in turn may 
require a subordinate bureau to follow rules andior regulations tnaL they 
may design. The administrators of bureau C, in other words, may be 
required to follow both A's and B's regulations (with A's regulations 
having priority), create further regulations for :I.ts own jurisdictior.al 
area and add still more requi.rements on to the a.c.tion agency, bureau D, 
thus D must follow thE" regulati-oTls of As B, and C • 
. Though RUD maintains several hundred. action agencies, and several 
regional offices throughout the country, this study will focus on a 
model that is indicative of the bureaucracy, but limited to one regional 
office and one actiol1 agency (see Figure V1I.). 
This model, like the action agency's ideal model, is widely pub­
licized and adhered to for most routine administrative activities-­
for the same reason, public accoul1tabllity. HUD, and the entire urban 
renewal bureaucracy, including this model, is being continually examined, 
probed, investigated and ,monitored, by Congress, the mass media, inter­
est and pressure groups, revolutionaries of all types, millority groups of 
every description, etc. A Weberian like model provides a structure for 
a maximization of accountability through rationalized administration, 
:in that each bureau is responsible for its jurisdictional area with 
ultimate responsibility and authority at the top, the head bureau. 
The ideal model represents the organization of public record, like 
the action agency, the formal rules and regulations; the accounts of 
bureaucratic activities; the dispensing and withdrawing of funds from 
a program or project all follow this model. 
1;3 
FIGURE VII 
THE URBAN RENEv,'AL BUREAUCRACY: IDEAL MODEL 
A. 	 Department of Housing and Urban Development: Washington, D. C. 
Al. 	Department of Housing and Urban Development: Regional Office, 
San Francisco, California. 
B. 	 City Council: NcCannville. 
C. 	 Model Cities Citizen Planning Board: McCannville. 
D. 	 McCannville Development Commission. 
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However well designad, the ideal type bureaucracy often requires 
modification in light of: (1) fortuitous events; (2) time limitations; 
(3) personnel weakne'sses in critical positions within the bureaucracy; 
or (4) bureaucratic "red-tape." As a result, the most common m,odifi·­
cation of the ideal bureaucracy is illustrated in Figure VIII. 
The solid arrows represent lines of authority on a superordinate 
basis--while the broken arrows illustrate channels of communication. 
This figure demonstrates the rigidity of the ideal model. in t:hat lines 
of authority and communication are arranged in terms of Weber's ideal 
model. 
This model is most often used when there is a time limitatior. / 
involved that precludes the use of the ideal model. An empirical eXl"~ple 
of the use of the working model involved the sudden availability of 
$100,000 that needed to be dispensed to an action agency within (appar­
ently) several hours. When the MDC was selectee! as a candidate for 
these funds, it was notified by telephone from the HOO offices in 
Washington, D. C., and given several hours to reply via the sa'lle media. 
The working model of the action agency {see Figure V) responded by hold­
ing an immediate conference, and a decigion was made to accept the 
$100,000. The total time element !nvolved from the initial receipt of 
the HUD notification of the ~unds, to acceptance. to HL~ confirmation 
of the additional funds, was approximately two and cne half hours. 
The next day the staff of the MDe was verbally notified of the grant, 
but was warned that it was st:i1l a ~~, and not yet ready for public 
consumption. In the meantime, as per HUD rp.quest, the MDC prepared a 
formal application for the additional $100,000 to tlsupplement" the already 
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FIGURE VIII 

AN URBAN RENEWAL BUREAUCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 

A. 	 Department of Housing and Urban Development: Washington, D. C. 
Al. 	 Department of Housing and Urban Development: Regional Office, 
San Francisco, California. 
B. 	 City Council: McCannville 
C. 	 Model Cities Citizens Planning Board: McCannville 
D. 	 McCannville Development Commission 
This figure demonstrRtes a modification of the ideal public 
model. It is important to note that the modification is not an ex­
clusive one, noT. is It permanent, and that the public model is always 
in some form of operation. This particuls.r modification illustrates 
HUD by-passing bureaus,Al,B and C, dealing directly with the action 
agency, the McCannville Development COllllllission. 
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epproved and funded Neighborhood Development Progcam unde.r the current 
administration of the :HDC. This application containe.d all the support­
ing data explaining the need for the additional funds. Once the appli­
cation was approved by bureaus Band C, a senator from the state made 
a personal radio announcement of the additional $100,000 granted to the 
McCannvi1le Development Commission for urbcm rene'-la1. No formal records 
were kept of the telephone conversations or agreements, only file copies 
of the formal application. This type or activity was .lOt unco::nmcn, and 
the results were fruitful in that: (1) the modi.fication of the ideal 
model met the time requirement; (2) public accountability was met by 
filing a formal application through channels before H was pub1icl¥ 
announced; and (3) a senator was able to make some "political hay" by 
announcing the "award II of the additional funds to the :Neighborhood 
Development Program. 
It is through the unrecorded modification of the ideal model that 
many critical decisions are made that affect the entire bureaucracy and 
urban renewal. However, it is normally the ideal formal model that 
comes under the public's scrutiny and comment. 
The existence and the use of working ntode1s wi thin the bureau­
cracy is a classic example of the differential enforcement of rules and 
regulations by the head bureau. Normative standards established by the 
administrators of HUD require that the designated channels of the ideal 
public model be used for reasons of public accountability, failure to 
comply with this standard without the expH.cit approval nf HUD may mean 
actual loss of funds for existing or future programs. HUD,however 
reta:f.ns !Jverriding authority of the:.:stab1ished bureaucratic mec!1anisms 
and may si.gnifi.eantly compromise the ideal model in the attainmer.t of 
its goals. As demonstrated in the empir:.i.cal example, HUD by-passed 
bureaus A,B, and C and chose to deal directly with bureau D. Bureaus 
subordinate to HU'.J l:tkewise maintain working models aI!d use them in 
appropriate situations. The "appropriateness" of the use of the 
working model is largely determined by nL~. The existence of the 
normative standards allows HUD to control its subordiI~te bureaus through 
the exercise of its sanctioning power. 
Bureaucrats and Residents 
Maximization of citizen participation in the urban renewal process 
is a goal of the bureaucracy. It will be through the concept of citi­
zen participation that the theoretical concepts of this paper will be 
further examined. 
HUD has issued several directives pertaining to the role of citi­
zens.' participation on the action agency level (HUD RHA 7100.1). The 
following are two abstracts taken from those directives. 
Requirements for Citizen Involvement. A guiding principle 
of Departmental policy is to insure that citizens have the 
opportunity to participate in policies and programs which affect 
their welfare. Therefore, the workable program requires clear 
evidence that the commur.ity provides opportunities for citizens, 
including those who are poor and members of minority groups, 
to participate in all Hun assisted programs • • • The community 
will also .be expected to show \o!hat progress has been made during 
each certification period to achieve an adequate and effective 
degree of citizen involvement. 
A more explicit statement appear.ed in a similar document of later 
publication (HUD RHA 7217.1); 
It is HL~ policy to assure that maximum opportunities are 

provided for citizen involvement in the planning, develop­

m.ent and execution of programs assisted by the Department. 

Citizens should have clear and direct access to decision­

making in all stages of the 'lrban renewal process. 
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These statements represent HUD' s basic public positj.on on citizen 
participation. When transmit:ted through the bureaucracy to the action 
agency. the policy becomes a requjrement and a continual goal to be 
achieved over a period of time. HUD,however, leaves the choice of 
mechanism for the exel:cise of citizec partic:lpation to the local com­
munity and the structure of the part.icu1ar agency. 
To the action agency, then, the requirement for citizen partici­
pation in its programs becomes a part of its overall operation. In the 
case of the MDC, a separate staff section was designed to manage, 
report, organize and direct citizen participation as it related to Com­
mission projects. During the period of this study, the citizen partici­
pation staff was the largest department in the agency with more than 
seventeen members. 
HOD's requirement is relatively simple; citizens of t:he com­
munities involved in HUD sponsored pcograms will participate in the 
planning, development and execution of those programs. TIle mechanism(s) 
through which this process occurs is largely left up to the action 
agency, but HUD requires that some sort of measurement of citizen parti­
cipation be reported and tr~t the process be continually expanding and 
improving. The coercive nature of this program is manifested through 
HUD's ability to deny or grant federal funds to action agencies. If 
the residents of a project area complain too bitterly about the action 
aganc~.fs tactics, programs and staffs involved in citizen participation, 
the action agency is given opportunit.ies to defend itself, but if the 
negative pressure on the part of the residents continues the agency 
stands a chance of not b,e.i.ng funded for that particular project the 
following year, or having the funds siffiply withJrawn. ~fuat the Hu~ 
citizen participation policy has come to mean on the action agency level 
in essence is, citizens need to be uneutra1izedu through the partici­
pation process so that public dissention and opposit:f.on to urban renewal 
projects may be m.inimized. A;::tion agencies receive no additional awards 
of funds for citizen participation, but stand to lose greatly from 
citizen opposition, no~ only locally through civic and court actions 
and an unpopular press, but may b~ denied funds for their p:=ojects 
from HUD. Denial of federal funds would mean all but closure to the 
MOC. Though HUD requires citizen participation, it has developed no 
monitoring system for it, and seems to have little interest in it out­
side of a monthly nwnerical account of it, unless there are opposition 
and citizen complaints. HUD will tolerate distortion of this goal, 
until residents publicly demonstrate dissatisfaction; then it retains 
the right to sanction the action agency involved. 
Citizen participation is not in itself a genuine process, but a 
constraining mechanism which this bureaucracy must contend with in 
achieving its goals. 
The lesson for the community organization is plain: the 

function of citizen participation is to support, not to 

create. TIle function of the professional is to create 

(Kramer and Specht, 1969:57). 

The }IDC views citizen participation as still another obstacle in 
the process of urban renewal. It, at the same time, realizes the 
essence (as previously discussed) of the HUD requirement and submits 
month;Ly reports of citizens' participation in its various projects. 
To the Cowmission, the idea of ordinary citizens actually taking 
part in complex planning, design and execution of complex urban renewal 
projecta seems much beyond the capabilicies of any citizenry. 
Such people are usually the objects of civic action; they 

are acted upon by others. but rarely do they themselves in­

itiate action. As a result they often develop a keen sense 

of the difference bety1een I!y'!e" and !!theyll--"they'! betng out­

side, city-wide civic and political forces which seek to 

police them, vote them, and redevelop them (Spiegel, 1968: 

51). 

Basically citizen pal'ticipation for the "average" citizen in the 
project areas is beyond his means of experience in organized endeavors 
of this nature, and in excess of hil:3 time available iOJ:: this kind of 
1
activity. It is a relatively easy process to obtain consent to re­
newal plans when people are thinking in terms of general goals and 
community-wide benefits, but it hes proven much more difficult when the 
same people are shown the same set of facts in terms of personal threats 
and costs. As a consequence, through HUD sanction, the MOe, and most 
other action agencies, have chosen to work through neighborhood organi­
zations representing the project areas involved. Thus, programs and 
projects are sold to the residents on a broad good-for-the-commonwealth 
basis. 
Ideally, the concept of citizens' participation recognizes the 
vested interests and concerns of the residents involved in the projects 
themselves, and as such, places some part of the power to shape or 
respond to su;!h programs in their hands (Spiegel, 1968). But: the ideal 
rarely becomes the real. The complexity 6f the factors involved in urban 
1. Through the participant-observation experience,I learned 
that a majority of the population of the Hayes District shared little 
interest in the concept of citizen participation, unless the fate of 
their o....m personal property ,-.;;as involved. 
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planning require the combined skills of city planning specialists) 
engineers, architects, relocation staffs, finance experts, etc" but Con­
gress, with the advent of the anti-poverty program, haa required admir.­
istrative agencies spending federal funds to maintain active programs 
of citizen participation. HUD l~s responded by developing a policy 
req~iring cit!=en participation on the action agency level, but leaving 
the mechanism for it largely up to the action agency itself. The result 
has been the formal accounting of citizen participation through re­
ports submitted to HUD on some type of regular basis, usually monthly. 
In order to better facilitate the administrative mechanisms of HUD, 
the citizen participation data (whic.h is in reality largely subjective) 
is translated into numbers and given the required simulacrum of object­
ivity. 
The MDC has translated the citizen participation concept into 
terms of citizen neutralization as previ.ously stated. Public, com­
munity confirmation and sanction of Commission urban renewal plans, 
is a useful mechanism in quelling the opposition of individual residents 
within the neighborhood and keeping publicity about its activities 
favorable. 
The Role of the Community Association in Relation to Achieving Bureau­
cratic Goals 
In an attempt to deal with the potentially unwieldly and chaotic 
process of citizen participation, HUD early in 1969 developed the 
concept of a Project Area Committee. 
A Project Area Committee (PAC) made up of residents of a 
project area, shall be established for each urban renewal 
project ill which residential , • • activities are contempla­
ted • • • The (action agency) shall work closely with the 
PAC to assure that project residents participate ill the form­
ulation and execution of plans fOl: ranewal of the area and 
improvement of the condition of its residents (HUD RHA 721i .5). 
In essence, thie 'vas a tremendous assist tc the action agencies. 
It, for all practical purposes, meant the end of dealing with individual 
residents on matters of citizen participation, as they were now refer­
red to their PAC. At this point the }IDC was able to deal with one organ­
ization per project area, which greatly simplified its task. Regular 
meetings were established, chairman and executive board members elected 
by local residents, and the Commission retained tight control. 
The MOC organized the first PAC in McCannville and literally pre­
pared the agendas for the meetings, typed the minutes, provided the meet­
ing places and served refreshments. The records of the PAC's meetings 
were (and still are) kept in the MOC files. Citizen participation in 
McCannville was under tne tight control of the MOC.' 
It did not take long,however, for at least some residents of the 
communities involved to sense that this process of participation was 
not all genuine, and low-keyed opposition began to be heard. At this 
point the citizen participation staff of the MDC realized that future 
PAC sanctio'[)'s of MOC urban renewal programs might be jeopardized, and 
as a consequence two adjustments were made: (1) the manipulation of 
the appearance of power; and (2) the development of options to simulate 
choice. 
First, the Commission realizE',c:. tl:.iat .:IS long as the residents felt 
controlled by MDe, there would be reasonable grounds for opposition to 
its programs. As a result the Commission began to play only a minor 
role in public PAC meetings, anSWering an occasional technical questioIl, 
serving refreshments, handing out agendas, and so on. Nothing really 
changed, only the manipulation of the appearance of power to the chair­
man of the PAC and their executive boards. Hence, the Commission 
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monopolized on the fact that the source of power most easily manipulated 
is the sense of leadership in organized groups (Kramer and Specht, 
1969:52). The chairman and h::f.s execm:ive board would always meet with 
the Co~~ission staff several days prior to the public general meeting. 
It is at these meetings that the Commission let its desires and needs 
be known. Opposition and problems aLe resolved at this level before 
the general membership ever becomes involved. In nearly all cases 
involving the Hayes District Community Association the decisions are 
made to support the Commission program prior to the general membership 
meeting. It is at this level that whatever compromises are required are 
made, so that at regular public meetings of the Project Area Committee 
(PAC), the Commission is sure of support from the ohairman and the 
executive board. 
Figure IX represents a sequential list of meetings, their topics, 
and the ratio of MDC staff to HDCA members. It is important to note the 
attendance of MDC staff to HDCA meetings fluctuated with the nature and 
purpose of the meeting--the more critical the meeting in relation to 
MOC programldng the more staff present. 
A ratio of nearly one to one of staff to members, when a critical 
decision was to be made, leaves little doubt as to the nature of citizen 
participation in McCannville. The following quotation is not a universal 
truth, but it is indicative of the situation: 
Sometimes when the cmmnunity begi.ns to ask hard or embar­

rassing questiocs, profession.ds retire beneath a msntle of 

experience and qualif:!,,:ations to d~mand that their judgments 

be accepted as revealec truth; administ,ators retre3t behind 

a slIioke screen of procedural objectives (Spiegel, 1965~67). 

FIGURE IX 

HDCA MEETINGS - MAY 2, 1969 TO APRIL 20, 1969 

5/2/69 Type: 	 Executive Board 
Purpose: 	 MOC Introduces Nei.ghborhood Devel­
opment Program to Executive Board 
(Nonpolicy Making) 
Ratio: 	 2 MDC Staff - J.O MeJTIbers (l: 5) 
11/16/69 Type: General Membership 
Purpose: Election of Officers (Nonpolicy 
Making) 
Ratio: 2 MDC Staff - 27 Members (1:3.5) 
11/19/69 Type: 	 General Membership 
Purpose: 	 Introduction of Neighborhood Devel­
opment Program's Financial Aid 
Program (Noncritical Policy l<Iaking) 
Ratio: 	 4 MOC Staff - 20 Members (1:5) 
12/9/69 Type; Exec.utive Board 
Purpose: Budget for Citizens' Participation 
(Policy Making) 
Ratio: 3 MOC Staff - 10 Members (1:3.3) 
1/7/70 Type: Executive Board 
Purpose: Acceptance of NDP Proposal (Critical 
Polky Making) 
Ratio: 12 MDC Staff - 9 Members (1:.75) 
1/13/70 Type: General Membership 
Purpose: Orientation to NDP by Staff (Policy 
Making) 
Ratio: 8 MDC Staff - 20 Members (1:2.5) 
1/27/70 Type: Executive Board 
Purpose: NDP Proposal and Changes (Policy 
Making) 
Ratio: 6 MDC Staff - 13 Members (1:2.1) 
2/10/70 Type; General Membership 
Purpose: Financial Assistance Program under 
~~P (Noncritical) 
Ratio: 9 MOe Staff - 33 Members (1:3.7) 
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FIGURE IX ~ontinued • • • 
2/16/70 
3/10/70 
3/31/70 
4/5/70 
4/14/70 
4/20/70 
Type: 
Purpose: 
Ratio: 
Type: 
Purpose: 
Ratio: 
Type: 
Purpose: 
Ratio: 
Type: 
Purpose: 
Ratio: 
Type~ 
Purpose: 
Ratio: 
Type: 
Purpose: 
Ratio: 
"Executive Board 

Fimll Approvel of :mp Proposal 

(Critical Policy Making) 

6 }ID~ Staff - 10 Members (1:1.6) 

Ge~eral Membership 

Introduction of Park Site Concept 

(Noncridcal) 

10 MDC Staff - 24 Members (1:2.4) 

Physical Planning Commltto::e 

Park Site Location (Critical Policy 

Making) 

7 MDC Staff - 5 Members (1:1.4) 

Physical Planning Committee 

Park Site Plan Approval (Critical 

Policy) 

8 MDC Staff - 5 Members (1:.72) 

General Member.ship 

Park Site Approval (Noncrit:f.cal 

Policy) 

9 MOC Staff - 102 Members (1:12.7) 

General Membership 

Park Site Approval (Noncritical Policy) 

9 MOC Staff - 115 Members (1:12.4) 
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The critical qucstio~ seems to be whether or not the conditions 
necessary for successful citizen engagement in urban renewal are toler­
able to the administrative, political and professional establishment 
in whose hands the initiation of such activities lies. For citizen 
participation is a social i.nvention developed outside of the llrban 
renewal bureaucracy and merely Rftxed to it. The concept of ordin­
ary citizens takj.ng part in impl.'oving the community is ccrtainly in 
keeping with the .\mcrican ideal of democracy. O~e finds little fault 
with the concept of citizen participation, but its practical application 
to urban renewal 8.ctivities had certainly fallen short of any original 
expectations (in reality). Simply, federally sponsored urban renewal 
projects require deaH.ng successfully with almost endless amounts of 
red tape. It has taken a long time for action agencies, model cities 
administrators and city governments to acquire the knowledge and exper­
ience required for this. Any expectations that citizens of a given 
urban renewal project have the time, interest and skills required for 
meaningful participation falls in the realm of the ideal. 
Although HUD requires citizens' participation on the part of its 
agencies it has also demanded, in the case of the MDC, that eighty percent 
(80%) of the work be completed in the first year's proposal in.the 
Neighborhood D~velopment Program, or the second year's funds would not 
be allocated. The impact of this requirement was to almost totally 
nullify all but token citizen participation in the Hayes District, for 
it put the Commission on a rigid time schedule for the accomplishment 
of certain tasks. 
Figure X is a timetable established by the :toIDC for the addition 
of t ..10 lots to the park site in the Hayes Distri.ct. 
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FIGURE X 
PROPOSED TIMET}~LE FOR PROCESSING THE HAYEP DISTRICT 
URBAN RENEWAL PLAN SUPPLEMENT'­
Purpose of Supplement: Addition of two lots to Park at Corner of 
Claremont and Oneonta. 
July 21 Approval of Hayes District Community Associatior.' s 
Physical Environment Commtttee. 
July 28 Approval of HDCA Executive Committee. 
August 4 Verbal contact, by telephone, with city agencies asking 
approval. 
August 7-11 Draft supplement. 
August 12 Itail copies of urban renewal supplement to HUD, Model 
Cities Citizen Planning Board. consultants and the 
president of the HDCA. 
August 14 Receive written agreements from city agencies. 
August 17 MDC resolutions approving supplements. 
August 19 Meeting of the HDCA general membership 
to park. 
to approve addition 
August 21 Mail copies of supplement 
Committee. 
to Model Cities Special Projects 
August 26 Approval of Special Projects Committee. 
September 1 Receive HUD approval of supplement. 
September 1 Approval of city council. 
September 1 Approval of Model Cities Citizens Planning Board. 
1. Taken from the actual Commission's timetable fer the Hayes 
District. 
58 
The HUD requirement for eighty percent (80%) proje::ct completion 
of the first yea-r's program or no funds for the second year is coercion. 
For the MDC, the Neighborhood Development Program provides approximatdy 
seventy-five percent (75%) of its operating funds. Consequently, citizen 
participation becomes citizen neutrali~ation so that the necessary work 
may be completed alld the time schedule met. Seventeen full-time Com­
mission staff are assigned to insure the success of this process. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
tfuat lIas Been Discussed: A Brief SUIlllTlary 
A Weber like ideal type bureaucracy has become the public ~)del 
fo~ an urban renewal b:::rcaucr:lcy. The Webcrian style Model 8.ffords 
maximum public accountability while maintaining a rational, logical 
structure of inter-bureau relationships. The publicly presented 
image of tbe urban renewal bureaucracy is one of a smoothly and effi­
ciently functioning organization based upon equalj_tarian principles. 
nlis image is se critical to the overall public perspective of the 
bureaucracy that the administration of it carefully records and docu­
ments the functioning of the Weber ian model. What We.ber intended to 
be an ideal type description of bureaucracy has manifested itself in 
the urban renewal bureaucracy as an ideology. For the Weberian l.ike 
ideal type model has become the publicly presented image of the 
bureaucracy, and as such is related to the American political concept 
of a democratically run institution. 1~e ideal model satisfies 
the political ~spects of the federally run institution in relation to 
public accountability, while the working models tend to be actually 
responsible for carrying ou.t the urban renewal processes. Because of 
the ideologic nature of the ideal model, records of its operation are 
carefully rr~intained in order to demonstrate the bureaucracy's commit­
ment to it. No records tend to be kept of the activities of the working 
models because of the obvious contradictions to the ideal model; therefore, 
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working models tend to be quasi-secret in nature. Thus, whatever 
information is gained from or about the urban renewal bureaucracy is 
usually in keeping with the functioning of the ideal model. 
Citizen participation was affixed to the ideal model by the Con­
gress of the United States. The concept of citizen particil,)ation would 
logically secm to be an extention of the ideology attached to the ideal 
model. That is, an enlightened citizenry assisting a democratically 
run bureaucracy was ·.ric'tved '!:Iy Congress as l'Jgical and desirable. 
The bureaucracy responded by formally incorporating citizen 
participation into the functioning processes of its ideal model. How 
the ideal and working models of an a.ction agency dealt with citizen 
participation was the essence of this thesis. 
During a nine month participant-observation study of an action 
agency, the "'MDC," the author became aware of the models operating with­
in the ideal public model. These "other" models were designated real or 
working models, and it was noted that they tended to exist on both inter­
bureau and bureau levels. These working models seemed to have more 
power in the actual administration of urban renewal activities than the 
ideal model. Working models co-exist with the ideal type, but because 
of their contradictory nature in relation to the ideal model, their 
activities tend to be unrecorded. 
Whereas, the operation of the ideal type model is theoretically 
based upon concepts like cooperation, equalitarian principles, and 
adherence to an established hierarchy of authority, the working model 
seems to function on concepts like coercion, differential enforcement 
of rules and r.egulations, and the dis~ortion of goals. It is important 
to note that the function of both real and ideal models is to achieve 
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the formal goalG cf the bureeucracy. 
Chapters three and four illustrate th~ concepts of real and 
ideal models on inter-bureau and bureau levels respectively. The 
concept of ci then partic:i.pation as a requirement in the urban renewal 
process on both levels provided a fOCUf: for the demonstration of both 
real and ideal modc!s. 
Some Lessons Learned 
What essentially happens in the urban renewal bureaucracy is that 
the administration views its goals in terms of the overall society; 
consequently the importance of the "end results!! seems to have precedence 
over how they are accomplished; i.e. if the pervasive society is sup­
portive of the ideal model and its goals, the urban renewal bureaucracy 
reports its activities in those terms--regard1ess if it functions in 
those terms or not. 
The result of these phenomcna, in terms of the cffect on those 
individuals subject to the urban renewal process, are considerably con­
sequential in that they are further removed from realizing any "voice" 
in the urban renewal process in their neighborhood. The resident is nearly 
totally "neutralizedu by the concept of citizens' participation itself. 
He is officially required to use the mechanism of the Project Area 
Committee, i.e. the HDCA, to voice his opinion on policy and decision 
making. The existence of MDC established citizen participation mechan­
isms tend also to mean MDC control over its activities; the resident 
then, is forced to deal with an exclusive mechanism for the exercise 
of his "right" to participate in the urban renewal process. The resi­
dents tcnd to be !teo-opted" by an organization that "1as formally 
established to insure their. active participation in the urban renewal 
process. Thus, if a resident w'ants to oppose an }fDC plan or program 
he must do so through the Project Area Committee, which, as has been 
illustrated, is largely contro11>:!d by the l1!JC. If the re::lident wishes 
to carryon his oppositicn, it will b~ in terms of opposing his neighbors' 
approved programs and plans, for the MOe uses the project area committees 
to gain public neighborhood COllsent and approval for its programs. Thus, 
the resident is faced with opposing his fl'lends and neighbors instead 
of the Commission. 
Although the study of real and ideal bureaucratic models is 
not new to sociology, the study of them in relation to particular 
bureaucracies can make additions to the understanding of them. The 
complexity of our society may be mirrored in the complexity of our 
bureaurcracies, and efforts to further the understanding 'Will hopefully 
be beneficial to the society. 
In addition to gaining general understandings of the functioning 
of a bureaucracy and how that functioning affects those parts of society 
that it comes in contact with, specific knowledge of working and ideal 
models may advance the ability of individuals who must deal with bureau­
cracies on the level discussed in this thesis to cope with them. With 
an understanding of the existence of working and ideal models, citizen 
groups, such as the HDCA, might be made sophisticated, more knowledge­
able, and perhaps even more powerful in taking part in the actual urban 
renewal process. If these thoughts seem a bit idealistic, the author 
pleads guilty. 
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Thoughts for Fu~ure Stud): 
This thesis :Ulumilla tes the nee.d for future study :1.n the operation 
of working and ideal models in complex organizations. The imj,llicationa 
of their existence and operation in the urban renewal bureaucracy 
raises the question of the extent of theiT universality in other complex 
organizations, and of the extent that the organizationts Itclient tt may 
or may not be subject to the operation of both v:orking and real models. 
With the ad'1ent of stete revenue sharing, the speculation that citj.­
zen participation would be even further diluted, is not an unreasonable 
forecast. For whatever cursory control that the administrators of HUD 
maintained over the action agency in the realm of citizen participation 
would be given up to individual states, and consequently to t::te cities 
carrying out urban renewal projects within the state, a probable result 
being the concept of city-wide citizen participation) regulated by the 
action agency T3ther tl~n citizen participation in each project area. 
Consequently, in the city-wide race and competition for available funds, 
the best ot"ganized, influential, powerful, and politically adept 
groups would undoubtedly receive preferential treatment, leaving those 
groups with little organization and resources with little hope of 
assistance. 
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